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## Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian Emergencies

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*Publication date:*  
1998

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Oberg, J. (1998). *Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian Emergencies*. Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, Aalborg Universitet.

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ISSN 0904-8154

## **Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian Emergencies**

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RESEARCH CENTER ON DEVELOPMENT  
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (DIR)

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WORKING PAPER NO. 66

September, 1998

## GLOBALIZATION AND RESPONSES BY CIVIL SOCIETY TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES<sup>1</sup>

One of the central intellectual, political and moral challenges of true preventive diplomacy is to find solutions to questions such as: how can civil society in general and NGOs in particular be strengthened to resist, endure and survive in times of severe economic crisis and during the accumulation of many and destructive developments hitting the social fabric?

Secondly, how can civil society serve as an early warner with a dense system of violence--preventive measures vis-a-vis future economic, complex crises and conflicts as well as other emergencies? And how can it be made to function effectively in the process of post-war peace building and help promote reconciliation where catastrophes have taken place?

Possible answers to such questions depend on the degree to which we learn to conceive of civil society in its historical and immediate reconstruction in terms of 1) human-based development and 2) development as sustainability coupled with 3) a peace culture based on self-protection in the face of the most brutalising factors internally and externally.

These are the issues addressed in this paper. The main case we will refer to is former Yugoslavia, one of the most politically significant, morally and intellectually challenging conflicts in contemporary history.

The analysis aims to demonstrate the considerable gap between what could be - a genuine civil society - and what is - globalizing economic and political power interests, beyond democratic control, that shape the roots of violence and wars in, or against, civil society.

### **Civil society and power**

#### *Civil society*

A glance at the literature on 'civil society' reveals that it is pretty much of a 'Humpty-Dumpty' term; it means, by and large, whatever people who use it choose it to mean.<sup>2</sup>Sometimes it is

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<sup>1</sup> This is partly a reflection of a presentation made by professor Jan Oberg in April 1998 at DIR, Aalborg University. Professor Jan Oberg is employed by the Transnational foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden

<sup>2</sup> In what follows we shall rely to quite some extent on an excellent, short analysis by Dale Thomas, The Meanings of Domestic Civil Society and Global Civil Society, presented at the 1997 International Studies Association Convention in Toronto, March 1997, and on Joel Migdal's chapter, Integration and Disintegration: An Approach to Society-Formation, in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development

associated with 'non-state' or 'non-government' but dependent upon the state, sometimes it is seen as a countervailing force to totalitarian states, sometimes as an alternative way of organising society, and sometimes it is implied that civil society is a specific political society, rather in the direction of a sub-culture.

Dale Thomas stresses that for Hegel, civil society comprise the institutions and practices involved in production, distribution, and consumption of products that meet a variety of needs and wants; this "system of needs" forms the first of three moments of civil society, the two next being the system of justice and that of police and corporations. Thomas brings Gramsci's thinking on this formula: the State is equal to political society plus civil society where "political society is the arena of coercion and domination" and "civil society is that of consent and direction (or 'leadership'), i.e. the political space and collective institutions, he maintains, in and through which individuals form political identities.<sup>3</sup> We shall return shortly to the idea that civil society rests on leadership and is basically not violent..

As is well-known, Hobbes would have us believe that "every man is enemy to every other man" and that "the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" and therefore civil society is created as rational, scientific and ordered, ordered by a sovereign or state that monopolises the means of force and violence and serves as a unifying, conflict-resolving and, indeed, civilising arbiter. Anthony Giddens (1985, p. 20) determines that "what is 'outside' the scope of the state has, since the Enlightenment, been understood in various senses as 'civil society'." Even if, as it seems, we cannot avoid discussing what the (concept of) 'state' means - it would go beyond the space of this paper - let's just mention Giddens' definition of it as "a political organisation whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilise the means of violence to sustain that

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and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Clingendael, The Hague 1996.

A comprehensive list of civil society resources is found at <http://www.web.net/~pgs/pages/hrcivsoc.html> on Internet.

<sup>3</sup> Liisa Laakso points out in a paper Civil Society and the Consolidation of Multi-Partyism. With Special reference to the Notion of Patrimonial State, for the 17th IPSA World Congress in Seoul 1997 that for Gramsci there was an inevitable conflict between the state and civil society; they could relate to each other in three different ways, a) state dominating, b) balanced opposition, or c) a "utopia of a complex and well-articulated civil society absorbing the state." As we shall see, the first type is more typical for conflict areas such as former Yugoslavia.



rule. Such a definition is close to that of Weber, but does not accentuate a claimed monopoly of the means of violence or the factor of legitimacy."<sup>4</sup>

Sometimes 'civil society' is associated with 'non-state' or 'non-government' but independent of and distinct from the state. Marxist thinking can be placed here; instead of being the moral, rational authority and 'the Universal' (Spirit) or, indeed, a source of freedom (Hegel), Marx argued that the state rests upon civil society which it does not transcend but whose class structure it reflects; as Giddens points out, civil society came to imply much of what was referred to as 'the countryside' and local community. However, "with the rise of the modern state, and its culmination in the nation-state, 'civil society' in this sense simply disappears," he maintains. And then Marx stipulated the demise of the state.

If this is so, we may indeed already ask here: what are we left with?

Ernest Gellner maintains with reference to the dissolution of the Soviet Union that "Marxism had taught that civil society was a kind of moral fraud, but 70 years of secular messianism had engendered a passionate thirst for just this fraud" (1994, p 179).

Eric Hobsbawm employs 'civil society' with reference to the nineteenth-century bourgeois society's assumption that "the bulk of its citizens' lives would take place, not in the sphere of government, but in the self-regulating economy and in the world of private and unofficial associations ('civil society')" (1994, p. 139). He also refers (*ibid.*, p. 490) to the Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe - "there was a tidal wave of talk about 'civil society', i.e. the ensemble of voluntary citizens' organisations or private activities, taking the place of authoritarian states, and about the return to the principles of revolutions before Bolshevism had distorted them. Alas, as in 1848, the moment of freedom and truth did not last. Politics, and those who ran the affairs of state, reverted to those who usually occupy such functions. The ad hoc 'fronts' or 'civic movements' crumbled as rapidly as they had risen."

In other words, it looks like 'civil society' is either dependent upon or swallowed by the state, or tend to disappear.

In everyday parlance, 'civil society' is now and then used as counterpoised to 'military'. Another somewhat related definition holds that civil society is made of individuals and

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<sup>4</sup> At the same time, Joel Migdal (*op.cit*) makes the good point that, however formidable their powers, states are not unlimited, independent actors and should not be reified; "we can best understand them as one organisation - among many other social organizations - in a society," he maintains.

organisations whose relations are not based on force. In yet other conceptualisations 'civil society' is related to the market, to entrepreneurs, production and the overall functioning of modern liberal capitalism. In this respect, Dale Thomas refers to Paul Wapner's definition of civil society as "that domain of human affairs lying between the individual and the state. It is the network of economic, social and cultural practices based on friendship, family, private property, and voluntary affiliation."<sup>5</sup>

To others again the term points in the direction of 'social movement' or NGOs or 'tertiary sector.' This school of thought would say that it is anything between family and government; that it denotes voluntary association, active social getting-together around some kind of broadly defined cause; that it is a mosaic of initiatives that try to assert command over their own destiny, more - or, particularly less perhaps - in co-operation with governments. Finally, it is organised; a farmer in the bush is not a civil society member unless (s)he is member of some kind of interest organisation or association.

Does the finance and banking world belong to civil society? Do refugees and displaced persons? What about liberation movements or terrorists that clearly do not belong in any sense to the state but do use violence or threaten its use? What about other people who go in and out, so to speak, of civil society? What about an NGO that receive government funds? Is there a local, a regional, a national and an international 'civil society'? Are the alternative UN world conferences that take place parallel to government conferences expressive of such an emerging global 'civil society'? If so, what makes that legitimate, from where do they secure legitimacy and who is their constituency? How far can the feeling of community, of identity, stretch that is essential for the definition of 'civil society'? Sometimes 'civil society' borders more on civilisation, on dialogue and educational quality. Some would use the concept as part of modernity, liberal myth and discourse in the 'public domain'. Internet is sometimes seen as a tool for reasserting 'civil society' vis-a-vis government and other power sources.

'Civil defence' connotes the need for (the state) protecting its citizens by means, for instance, of shelters and stockpiling of strategic resources to meet times of crisis. 'Civil resistance' denotes that people organise non-violent resistance against the military policies and instruments of the state.

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and Global Civil Society, in *Dissent* 41, 1994.

Civil society is not an easy concept. Perhaps, when everything has been said, 'civil society' should not be understood as a set of actors but as a sentiment, a political culture, an ever changing combination of world views, myths, communication structures, individuals with little or no organisation, waves rising and falling according to events in as well as outside that very 'society' and defined by those who are not 'members' of it rather than by those who are?

Civil society is hardly a society within society. Indeed, perhaps it is not even a 'society' according to most sociology textbook? And if it is, it is closer to "Gemeinschaft" than to "Gesellschaft," for sure. Perhaps it is not exclusively non-violent, taking into account that more or less 'revolutionary' movements tendentially, at least, release (or threaten to release) violent activity?

When social systems fall apart as was the case in the ex-Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia, do 'civil society' continue to exist as a kind of 'community of souls' rather than as a political community? Or to turn the question around: is there a 'civil society' today just because authoritarian structures fell apart? And what, after all, do we do with 'civil society' actors who turned into warlords, local war heroes, media propagandists, private arms dealers, drug traffickers, Mafioso, Hells Angels etc? If more than 1000 people are killed per year in the greater Chicago area, does that area belong to or constitute a 'civil society'? Perhaps civil society is, at least tendentially, not at all a society and neither that civil - civilised, non-military, non-governmental, or civic?

### *Power*

Seeing 'civil society' slipping out of our hands, let's approach it from another angle: 'Civil society' is about power or, rather, about different and dissenting conceptualisations of it.

Power, as is well-known, is another difficult and 'essentially contested' concept. It is usually defined as the ability of A to make B do what A wants B to do or abstain from doing what A does not want B to do. Thus, power is power over others, the control and command over resources in a zero-sum game. The state par excellence is the highest expression of that concept and we invariably relate the state to other concepts such as self-interest, national interest, rule, force, authority/tarianism, domination, warfare, repression, dictatorship - as well as to welfare,

the power to remunerate allegiance and punish disobedience, or simply keep others out (migration and refugees).

However, power has many other definitions. For instance, Robert C. Tucker argues in favour of a Platonian concept. He says: "Just as medicine is the art of tending to the body with a view to restoring it to a healthy state, so statesmanship is tendance of the soul...The true statesman, possessing knowledge of what is good for man, is a physician of souls...I think it is fair to characterise Plato's dissenting view as one that equates politics with leadership." (1981, p.2).

He argues that there are politically very important leaders who possess power and occupy high political offices but are nonconstituted, and mentions e.g. Mahatma Gandhi, Luther King, Jr., Albert Schweitzer, Milovan Djilas, Jean Monnet and Andrei Sakharov<sup>6</sup>. Thus, power holders are not necessarily leaders, whereas genuine leaders always have power - a power quite different, indeed the power of the Prince.

Tucker quotes James MacGregor Burns to the effect that leadership can be seen as "leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations-the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations-of both leaders and followers." Tucker maintains that although we cannot deny that Hitler and Stalin were political leaders, they were predominantly absolute wielders of brutal power.

Genuine leaders, not dictators, flourish in problem situations by doing basically three things: a) diagnosing the situation, b) prescribing a course that will meet the situation, and c) mobilise the community and its support for action towards a commonly defined, acceptable solution.

For our purposes, it seems attractive to define 'civil society' as social actors and activity as well as ways of thinking that rest on leadership; that is, which embodies the goals, values and motivations of leaders as well as followers and therefore does not rest on force. From a theoretical and ethical viewpoint it is important, it seems to me, to not equate power with brute force or the threat of using it.

Thus, any individual, movement, institution that rests essentially on this understanding of power is part of civil society. Thus, for instance, social movements rise, says Tucker (ibid,

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<sup>6</sup> Today we might add, among others, Nelson Mandela, Dalai Lama, Mother Theresa and Diana Spencer, although admittedly very different in roles and personalities.

p.85), through successful leadership authority of a sort not being undertaken by constituted authority, i.e. through nonconstituted leadership. And he predicts, I think correctly, that "the capacity of human civilisation to endure on earth has come to depend upon the development of leadership of and for the whole. The emerging crisis of survival [of the state-dominated global system, J0] is, along with all else, one of leadership deficiency. The spaceship cannot fly much longer unpiloted." (ibid., p 130).

We are here, in effect, reminded of the definition of power provided by Gene Sharp (1973), one of his comprehensive analyses of Gandhian politics. He states: "Basically, there appears to be two views of the nature of power. One can see people as dependent upon the good will, the decisions and the support of their government or of any other hierarchical system to which they belong. Or, conversely, one can see that government or system dependent upon the people's good will, decisions and support...non-violent action is based on the second of these views: that governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources. The first view...-appears to underlie most political violence."

Thus, rulers are dependent upon people who accept them as rulers and provide the sources of power such as their authority position, the material resources they command, the obedience they require, their psychological and ideological outlook and the sanctions at the ruler's disposal. When 'civil society' members decide to withdraw from a power system and stop providing the sources for it, the ruler will no longer be able to rule. To put it crudely, Hitler could not have fought the battles, burnt the people and arrested all opponents by his own naked fists.

Empowerment begins at the realisation that traditional power, power 'over others,' is dependent and therefore, that alternative power seeks independence - 'power over oneself.' And this is pro-actively where we find the power source of civil society.

### *Civil society as government*

There is a tendency to see civil society as 'good', as more honest and democratic and much less involved in raw power politics and deception than governments. That is true but there is no wall between the two.

Governments often succeed in co-opting civil society, either individual members or virtually all of it, willingly or unwillingly. Within some of the above-mentioned definitions, 'civil

society' - in the sense of 'non-government' - sometimes do take part in government-induced ethnic cleansing, hoisting of nationalist flags and displaying nationalist symbols, singing of anthems and voting for constitutions that makes life virtually impossible for minorities. With sufficiently low education and being sufficiently deprived of welfare, or having its expectations toward the future thwarted, civil society, or elements thereof, is quite ready to cause human suffering.

The most frequent type of wars today are domestic. In these civil - some say uncivil - wars, several wars are embodied in one complex war theatre. There are wars on the mind, wars on perceptions, war in the schools, the media and even between and inside families; they are also wars on identity and history, on cultural existence and not only physical existence.

In other words, civil wars are also fought by 'civil society' under the monolithic state-based power theory when that has penetrated into the minds of sufficiently many civilians, as has been pointed out by Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1996). So, there is no clear borderline. Young people joining voluntarily the army or paramilitary units in moments of crisis leave behind them 'civil society' and 'leadership' power and join the petty- or state-based monolithic - but constituted - power world.

So, in various ways 'civil society' can be co-opted to provide the sounding board for nationalist or otherwise authoritarian government policies. No government can get away with warfare without having some support by some sections of civil society.

Likewise, civil society increasingly take over the role of government. Local lords who are de facto leaders in regions (e.g. Fikret Abdic in the Bihac pocket in Bosnia) or have proclaimed their own states with a few followers (e.g. South Ossetia), or set up small economic empires and Mafioso cultures (e.g. the Croatian Herceg-Bosna with Mostar as its capital) exemplify this.

Consequently, ordinary government power is being eroded unless, as is the case in Mostar, such proto-states serve interests of the "real" centre, in this case Zagreb's politico-economic and military elites. Governments ain't what they used to be and governments don't seem to know what to do when faced with these relatively new types of leaders - gangsters, thugs, arms traders, warlords, terrorists, secessionists. Neither do they seem to know how to handle an unconstituted, constituted leader who advocates pragmatic non-violence such as Dr. Rugova in Serbia's Kosovo/a province.

When civil society takes over government functions (however, frequently only those they profit on in terms of "state power" and/or money), traditional government and the state loses con-



trol as part of a long term fragmentation strategy. So, it is fragmentation of government power and reintegration in new but ideologically old authoritarian structures. New states invariably have bigger "old" states as role models. The net result is brutalisation.

Sadly, some civil society organisations, CSOs, in the limited sense related to peace, rights, gender equality, environment etc which espouse peace values are double losers. Their "civilised" norms are exposed as powerlessness when civil society is undermined by the thugs; ordinary government which was (perhaps) once quite decent needs rapid responses to turbulence and turns more brutal and, thus, more immune to the influence of peace values.

Around the globe we see civil society become militarised both in terms of mentality and violent means. Indeed, privatisation and appropriation of military power (warlordism) is on the rise. So, the monopoly on the threat with and employment of violent means that used to be a defining characteristic of the state is also eroded (private arms dealers).

Another visible trend - less harmful, but anyhow deplorable - is CSOs acting increasingly as semi-governments in their goals, perceptions and modes of operation. In the field of humanitarian aid that may well be a consequence of the fact that the proportion of official emergency aid channelled through governments has declined significantly during the 1980s, i.e. in the privatisation of welfare provision in war and emergencies.<sup>7</sup>

The well-known maxim that power corrupts, however, also applies to CSO power. Individually and as institutions some NGOs water down their aims, goals and values to appear "salonfähig" and "realistic" in the corridors of government and other elite powers.

As lobbyists they "go native" and lend not only their competent brains but also their hearts to the powers that be - all to secure the promotion of their causes, perceived as noble. They compete with any other CSO standing in their way and queue up willingly at any Hilton Hotel reception to market their message on behalf of the damned of the earth.

Some organise themselves as corporations or governments, they speak the same diplomatic language, emulate the jet-setting lifestyles of government elites. Concomitantly with supporting human rights, bringing humanitarian aid, reporting from the war, promoting culture or showing empathy and solidarity with the victims of wars, which is all fine - they hold press

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<sup>7</sup> See Joanna Macrae, *Purity or Political Engagement? Issues in Food and Health Security Interventions in Conflict Situation*, 1996.

conferences about who is right and wrong, condemn whole countries, argue for sanctions and war tribunals, military interventions etc. For this category of CSO leaders the natural next step, predictably, is to be in government - through membership of a party, media corporation or other career-making machinery. (And, indeed, governments and state bureaucracies would be foolish not to try to attract such dynamic "operators").

When 'civil society' adopts the methods of governments one way or another they can, of course, no longer serve to restore civil society's values in a genuine sense or to help those who suffer and need humanitarian assistance.

### *Civil society as democracy and institutions*

Many analyses emphasise democracy and institution-building and institutional reforms as essential features of civil society, whereas the present expose departs, at least implicitly, from the assumption that values and cultural norms and programs are at least as important for the struggle to prevent violence and promote peace.

As we shall see later in the critique of the Dayton accord<sup>8</sup> for Bosnia, institutions can be exported from abroad into conflict areas and failed states; some believe they will function in a few years. What can not be imported are the culturally and historically based values and traditions, the tolerance, education and political culture of co-operation, consensus and legitimacy as well as the special care for non-majoritarian opinions all of which is conducive to, indeed the essence of, democracy - i.e. democracy in the sense of a never-ending process, the "democratising democracy."<sup>9</sup>

It's a platitude, but one that has not yet reached decision-makers among governments and conflict-managing organisations, that democracy is first a set of values, tolerance and openness, a sentiment of plurality and creativity and only second a parliament, assembly and elections. Paradoxically, perhaps, democracies produce 'constituted' leaders. They may rise over and above that status and transform themselves into 'unconstituted' leaders whom we have determined above to be essential for the development of civil society. It is interesting that civil society's

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<sup>8</sup> The Dayton accord stipulates a series of institutions but is completely void in terms of this indefinable something that makes institutions work and which is based on education, cultivation of democratic values, respect and tolerance. Much of this is problematised excellently by Richard Sandbrook and Claude Ake elsewhere in this project.

<sup>9</sup> See reference to Giddens' idea of dialogic democracy' in section 2.5.



unconstituted leaders usually do not acquire their status through normal democratic and electoral processes but they can be responsive to or compatible with democracy and its values (otherwise they are authoritarian, warlords or dictators).

In short, those who have power in civil society derive it from something more universally human, an ability to 'speak to the hearts' of constituencies much larger and thematically much broader than any political party typical of democracies.

### *Civil society as peacemaker*

While civil society is not necessarily "innocent" but is capable of creating violence in a variety of ways, it can also create peace with, without or even against its own and other governments. Why?

Because civil society does not (have to) monopolise the means of warfare as does the state; it can refuse to participate in wars fought by states/governments with civil society resources and against other civil society. Civil society is vital in building and preserving social peace, and provide conflict management among citizens. A strong, alert civil society can resist its own brutalisation.

In addition, civil society does not decide or conduct foreign policy, it doesn't decide about foreign interventions and it does not decide to start nor end wars.

These features seemingly makes civil society appear weak vis-a-vis state apparatus. This may be true in terms of the capability to do harm and destroy and impose its will upon others. But that is only one definition of power, and hardly the one on which a better future can be built.

Civil society is potentially much stronger than the state precisely in that it does not build on outdated state-based concepts of power. It embodies the ability to apply constructive powers different from that of the state system - provided it is (made) aware of it.

Civil society politics does not have to be "anti-politics" in the sense Hungarian writer György Konrad (1984), implies. But it does mean a power and a politics different from a politically decaying, economically marginalised and increasingly demoralised state.

Certainly, civil society is not autonomous, but the totality of human relations it embodies within a given culture has a degree of autonomy while it is also interdependent with the state, whether authoritarian or democratic, and with like-minded as well as culturally different civil societies.

Anthony Giddens (1994) argues convincingly that the control of the means of violence holds far-reaching consequences for a wider understanding and practise of democracy:

"..at the very time then liberal democratic systems seem to be spreading everywhere, we find those systems under strain in their very societies of origin. The problem of democracy, or so I shall argue, is closely bound up with a further dimension of modernity: control of the means of violence. The management of violence is not these days part of conventional forms of political theory, whether left, right or liberal. Yet where many cultures are thrust into contact with one another, as in current social conditions, the violent clash of fundamentalism becomes a matter of serious concern."

Democracy, Giddens continue, has two dimensions: it is a vehicle for the representation of interests but it is (should also be) "a way of creating a public arena in which controversial issues - in principle - can be resolved, or at least handled, through dialogue rather than pre-established forms of power. While the first aspect has probably received most attention, the second is at least equally significant," he says and goes on to emphasise the vital need for democratising democracy in the direction of "dialogic democracy", i.e. a reflexive social order where people feel free to more or less ignore the formal political arena if they so wish and where the pre-established ways of doing things are increasingly ignored.

What Giddens here underlines is an important aspect of civil society. When it seeks to (re)gain strength in and of itself and does so in particular before, during and after war where the means of violence have compromised, if not undermined, the legitimacy of the "old" ways of doing things.

Thus, democratisation can not be a matter of re-installing simplified formal schemes of multiparty systems through more or less free and fair/fraud elections as we have seen repeatedly, most recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. That is only to export a seriously crisis-ridden feature of Western liberal democratic society.

Democratisation is precisely about making possible the emergence of a dialogic democracy where people (or rather citizens) feel free to not only play the role of actors in a play written by outsiders - or the state - but become writers of their own life politics and, as emphasised by Giddens, feel free to identify their own values and build their institutions - autonomously and

interdependently - vis-a-vis a state that corrupted their lives through its control, use and misuse of the means of violence.

This also pertains to the domain of conflict management. Dialogic democracy can be viewed as "peace by peaceful means." While one can imagine that civil societies can move in the direction of dialogic democracy and non-violent conflict-resolution, it is much harder to see the international system do the same as long as it is run by violence-based states to the extent it is. Thus, this contribution focuses on ways to empower civil society to become more autonomous in its handling of conflicts.

### *Civil society as global*

However conceptualised, however overlooked, there is a civil society locally. Is there a global civil society, too? Craig Wakentin (1997) in an interesting contribution starts out by defining 'civil society' as "the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules."<sup>10</sup> 'Society' he argues, is norm-governed and differs in that from 'systems,' whereas 'community' signifies an "affective unity". So, the international system is a system and probably a society (a 'middle ground' conceptually) but not a community - interestingly since the term "international community" is now widely used by media and academia. Be this as it may, Warkentin relies heavily on Ronnie Lipschutz' conceptualisation of global civil society, i.e. an arrangement of political interaction that runs parallel to the conventional ("constituted") state-centered approach "one that does not take anarchy or self-help as central organising principles, but is focused on the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentred, local actors, that cross reified boundaries of space as though they were not there" (Lipschutz 1992). Lipschutz continues: "While global civil society must interact with states, the code of global civil society denies the primacy of states or their sovereign rights. This civil society is 'global' not only because of those connections that cross national boundaries and operate within the 'global, nonterritorial region', but also as a result of a growing element of global consciousness in the way the member of global civil society act.." which leads to a planetarization of action and a transsocietal order, he maintains.

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<sup>10</sup> Originally formulated by Larry Diamond in Journal of Democracy 5:4-17.

This is a very fruitful description of the emerging global civil society; for our purposes here, nothing more precisely formulated is needed. The emphasis on consciousness, on acting as if the international system were different from what it is and the emphasis on civil society being parallel to and not a substitute for the state is easily appreciated and useful for our next step here.<sup>11</sup>

### **Civil society's many opportunities**

It goes without saying that the potentials and activities of a given civil society and CSOs depend significantly on the specificities of the conflict and the character of the culture and situation; below we focus on what seems generally possible and applicable. We shall also assume that there are CS actors at the local, the national, the regional and the global level who may, in principle, join forces with each other as well as with governments to the extent that their identity as CS organisations is preserved.

#### *Civil society's role in preventing emergencies*

Any society's socio-economic system is central in shaping that society's future. To promote violence-prevention and prevent emergencies it must, first of all, attend to the minimum basic needs of all its citizens. Before turning to foreign sources, maximum efforts should be devoted to satisfy locally the needs for water, shelter, social security, clothing, health, education etc.

If local circumstances coupled with resource mobilisation do not provide for the satisfaction of such minimum needs, CSOs and the governments may turn to external sources, be it the next municipality, the neighbouring region or country and/or an international donor, trade partner and/or organization, but preferably somebody like-minded.

The overriding priority is to avoid being subordinate, helpless, exploited or "clientilised" by one's own state as well as by other states. It should become possible and natural for CSOs, not only governments, to turn to international organisations for aid; international organisations that intervene only upon government appeals for help and channel that help only through governments will not be able simultaneously to promote democracy, since democracy must also emerge from the ground-up.

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<sup>11</sup> One new voluntary association emerging since Lipschutz wrote his article, is the Internet with its ORNs-on-line resource networks.

For donors to refuse to assist civil society because the government does not meet criteria or is considered undemocratic by the donor community is a recipe for punishing citizens rather than such a government.

Another important factor is conditionality. With the increasing universalisation of Western-conceived human rights, representative, parliamentary democracy and market economy, it is tempting for donors to engage in aid, lending, trade or investment with countries which meet certain criteria or declare themselves willing to convert enough to qualify for such relations. Based upon experiences such as those in Yugoslavia and Somalia more discussion is needed: where is the boundary between making or forcing nations to be what we, the international community so-called, want them to be and becoming what they want to be? Self-determination and independence as principles do not apply to political or legal status only; any local community, country or region has a right to determine its future and a right not to have somebody else's future vision imposed upon them. To deny assistance to countries which violate basic norms of the international community - assuming that such norms actually exist - is one thing. Saying, in effect, "you will receive nothing unless you give up your right to choose - your economic self-determination - and become the society, country or region we demand," is quite another.<sup>12</sup> Respecting general, mutually acceptable norms and working out compromise is an acceptable way of managing conflict and does not preclude self-reliance as a political and economic strategy. Selling the nation's uniqueness, pride or even soul is, again, quite another. This has happened repeatedly to, for example, aboriginal societies, to the world's rainforest regions and to numerous smaller countries in non-Christian cultures. The Gandhian movement for India's independence was precisely a struggle for the preservation of India's soul but simultaneously for a worldwide co-operation based on mutuality and non-violence in its broadest sense.

Self-reliance in terms of minimum basic human and social need satisfaction also provides for diversification in the global community. Thus, if a catastrophic economic crisis happens

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<sup>12</sup> Cultural imperialism and cultural violence abound in the contemporary world system, in consequence of the globalisation process we discuss in section 4. Like virtually all other evils throughout human history, this is committed in the name of doing good, promoting human rights, introducing market economic growth, rule of law and helping disadvantaged states to join important globalising agencies and enjoy the benefits from finance and credit institutions.

somewhere it will not set in motion an all-encompassing chain reaction.<sup>13</sup> The effects of the breakdown can be contained since all others are sure to survive due to their high level of invulnerability, low degree of dependence and optimum self-reliant capacities. Without exception, ecological knowledge speaks for the assumption that, given other things being equal, diversity increases the probability of systems surviving when under stress.

In contrast, the present global trend towards asymmetric and dependent integration/absorption of weaker under the stronger economies is a recipe for insecurity and helplessness. A crisis in one centre of such a globally interdependent economy will vibrate through the entire system and involve everybody else in its fall and, thus, create an economic "domino effect."

Thus, civil society should strive towards selective inter-dependence or functional self-reliance, i.e. being dependent on stronger actors only in sectors of the economy that are non-vital to the very survival of that economy. In many instances this is likely to incur higher economic costs, but the other side of that coin is engraved with social, political and cultural benefits.<sup>14</sup>

### *Security and defence*

Self-reliance is not only a wise strategy for economic development. It also serves security. Most governments still seek security in military means and offensiveness, i.e. the capability to inflict pain, destruction and human loss on somebody else; this is supposed to prevent potential enemies from attacking. Thus, offensive military means are considered more important than civilian defensive means.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The financial crisis of countries such as Mexico, Thailand and South Korea in recent years and of whole regions makes it abundantly clear that interdependence and global integration-cum-homogenization beyond a certain point, admittedly difficult to define, is dangerous.

<sup>14</sup> The author is well aware that the concept of self-reliance makes some think of Hoxha's Albania or North Korea. However, autarchy, self-isolationism, normative and moral self-satisfaction or national narcissism have nothing to do with self-reliance.

<sup>15</sup> This is hardly entirely unrelated to the Occidental cosmology, to Christianity and the science-based culture it has created.



To promote violence-prevention and a peace culture<sup>16</sup>, civil society must reason differently.<sup>17</sup> The overarching interest of civil society, sometimes in direct contrast to that of the state, is to minimise destruction, i.e. damage limitation. The ideal therefore is to a) be non-provocative so that nobody else is tempted to attack, b) to use less-than-totally destructive means so that society and its citizens can survive, c) to provide protection and d) avoid all-out war so that even the smallest opportunity for a breakthrough in negotiation may be facilitated.

Civil society must try to assert itself as a subject in defence and security, not as a helpless object and potential victim of the state which monopolises the use of violence. That, of course, cannot be attained by imitating the state and thus arming all civilians. It can only be done by putting up a qualitatively different defence and security which can, when desirable or necessary, co-function with that of one's own government should an outsider attack. In authoritarian states, civil society will do wise to guard itself against the central authorities and that can be done only non-violently since civil society cannot militarise itself to compete on that scale without undermining its own defining characteristics as civil society.

The first line of defence is to increase invulnerability of the populace, economically and socially. The next is to organise for civil preparedness, social functions, wartime parallel organisations to provide the basic resources to keep the people alive. Civil resistance and general peace service would be an integral part of it.

When it comes to military means, they must be defensive, that is limited in terms of range, firepower and mobility. It can be employed in the countryside, whereas no military struggle is possible in industrial towns or modern mega-cities.

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<sup>16</sup> Elise Boulding defines a peace culture, in broad terms, in the following manner: "A mosaic of identities, attitudes, values, beliefs, and institutional patterns that lead people to live nurturantly with one another, deal with their differences, share their resources, solve their problems, and give each other space so no one is harmed and everyone's basic needs are met...After all, none of us would be alive today if each society didn't have some little bits of nurture and listening and caring... What do you do with guerrillas and soldiers when they're demobilised, if they have been killing each other as the Hutu and the Tutsi have done? You rebuild. You rebuild relationships and go through a healing process. So, as to move into the 21st century, rebuilding peace culture is what we have to do" (interview in Peace Work, American Friends Service Committee, January 1996).

<sup>17</sup> The body of literature on alternative defensive defence is now huge. Here are two examples which include military alternatives and not just non-violence or civil resistance, namely: Johan Galtung (1984) and Fischer, Nolte & Oberg (1989). The state of the art is monitored constantly and comprehensively in NOD & Conversion by Bjoern Moeller at COPRI, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.

The definition of self-defence is a local, national and regional system that employs only such military and civil means that can be used against an internal or external aggressor, but not on somebody else's territory.

If more countries moved in this direction, civil society would be strengthened and global militarisation and arms trade would shrink. The overall philosophy prompts that for each country (or other unit) to be optimally invulnerable, it must be able to provide for its own minimum defence needs and co-operate with those closest and like-minded. In contrast, imported weapons are likely to be isomorphic with the defence needs of the exporter, not with those of the importing country.

Furthermore, weapons imports is a transfer not only of foreign technology but also of organisation, management, education and culture; in short, it serves to graft the values and structures needed for bringing the country in question into the division of labour compatible with capitalist market globalisation.

Will such an alternative work? No alternative defence will work against overwhelming, destructive powers such as the use of nuclear weapons. The contemporary history of war quite clearly offers evidence that big, conventionally armed countries lose wars in smaller, structurally weak regions when actors there employ different methods.<sup>18</sup> Even non-violent civil resistance has changed world history when used against much more violent, powerful countries - but hardly ever reported by media as a victory for nonviolence.<sup>19</sup>

But on a world scale this type of thinking opens an opportunity for attacking the root causes of the arms race, overarmament and militarist policies while simultaneously creating safety for an otherwise victimised civil society.

The overarching consideration is that those who do not create conflicts and do not seek military solutions should be assisted in their search for ways to defend themselves against those

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<sup>18</sup> Vietnam, Afghanistan and Chechenya may serve as classical examples where the factor of morale also played an important part.

<sup>19</sup> Among examples from recent decades one could mention Prag 1968 and Solidarnosc' movement in Poland, the Baltic Republics 1989-91, the resistance that brought the Shah of Iran to fall, and the Catholic nuns in front of Marcos' tanks in the Philippines and the three-months of CSO demonstrations in Serbia. Indeed, the structure of the Cold War was dismantled largely due to two parallel set of factors, the Western movements of women, peace marchers, intellectuals and dissident generals on the one hand and, on the other in the Eastern bloc, the dissident movements of culture and science, the (East German) church and the introduction of the photocopier and fax but, above all, the leadership and vision of Mikhail Gorbachev who unfortunately found no dialogue partner at his own intellectual level in the West.



who do. Thus, building peace, sustainability and invulnerability into development, education and civil society politics may, over time, yield a considerable contribution to democratic defence and security, i.e. to common security of peoples vis-a-vis violence-based government.

### *Conflict-assessment*

It deserves mention that all social change and development policies contain potential conflicts. It can be argued, therefore, that conflict-risk assessment must become a vital ingredient in evaluating what to do and not to do. Technology and environmental assessment is now commonplace, conflict-risk analysis is not. Among the World Bank's roughly 11 000 employees, a handful are recently being tasked with evaluating the risks that bank-financed projects lead to social conflict.<sup>20</sup> Although there are some developments in both the European Commission's ECHO and the European Parliament's new mechanism, in the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DHA and UNHCR same goes for virtually all other international organisations and Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Compared with the attention and the resources allocated to the acting out of conflict, those devoted to prevent them or prevent the violence at an early stage in them are negligible. One example is the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna which is tasked with "reducing the risk of violence" and providing resources for preventive diplomacy while the OSCE itself is considered a "key organization" in conflict-prevention for its 55 member states. OSCE has an annual budget of US \$ 66 mill (or a bit more than 1 US \$ mill per member state in average). And the Conflict Prevention Centre's budget is US \$ 1,25 mill, staffed with 8 persons. Naturally, under these circumstances, no early conflict risk assessment is done, no systematic data collection of conflict-inducing and conflict-reducing indicators is done and no conflict-relevant analyses can be produced.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Private conversation with World Bank employee, March 1997. Also, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington seems to be offering World Bank employees the first courses in conflict-related issues in 1997.

<sup>21</sup> Data from November 1997. To the total amount shall be added voluntary contributions from member states, e.g. 47 US \$ mill for municipal elections in Bosnia, 12 US \$ mill for the elections in Republika Srpska, 3,5 US \$ mill for democracy projects in Bosnia and 6 US \$ mill. to the present mission in Croatia (reaches 21 US \$ mill. in 1998 when OSCE takes over after the UN in Eastern Slavonia). The fact that voluntary contributions for ex-Yugoslavia are almost exactly as big as the entire OSCE budget tells you something about the relative importance of that conflict - and the relative insignificance of the OSCE in hard high politics and the real priorities of the member states.

Presumably, the two main reasons why the idea of early warning has been talked about since 1948 while virtually nothing has been done to implement it are a) the world's conflict analysis expertise is tiny, and b) major powers have military, arms export and other national interests incompatible with the idea of avoiding war.

### *Peace education*

Civil society's private, voluntary education-perhaps increasingly to be seen as parallel to what governments offer their citizens-is essential. Peace education in a broad sense of the term is a sine qua non of a stronger civil society that serves to minimise unnecessary violence.

Underlying all of this paper is the contention that the handling of conflicts, one's own as well as those of others can be learnt. Most societies are "conflict illiterate" in the sense that formal basic education, vocational training and higher education ignores peace and conflict-resolution knowledge in their curriculums. Computer training, car-driving and military proficiency are considered much more important in virtually all countries around the world.

Obviously, public education in civil society peace culture must be undertaken by civil society itself. It would encompass such institutions as training for peace services at home and abroad, peace academies, public information, peace research, training in conflict-resolution and negotiation skills etc.

As such education would take root from one generation to the next, the values of peace cultures would automatically gain strength and become a natural foundation, among others, of the formal educational system at large and thereby create benevolent circles; that is, promoting nonviolence as "normal" and require special justification for the advocacy of violence in human relations.

Over time nonviolence would become the norm and violence the exception that required (like nonviolence advocacy today) a special legitimization. The journalist's common question would not be: "Do you really think nonviolence can solve these conflicts?" but, rather, "Do you really think that violence can solve these conflicts?"

### *Media*

It's a platitude that modern electronic media influence human beings everywhere more forcefully than ever before. In spite of the fact that more people travel more and can see for themselves, the

majority form their worldviews and opinions on the basis of processed information derived through newspapers, radio, television and computers.

Media no longer only report, if they ever did; they create and shape events, they decide to a larger extent than ever before what is on people's mind, what gets into focus and what does not.

The so-called "information society" is part and parcel also of new warmongering policies. Recent wars such as those in the Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia carry evidence of the degree to which media can be (mis)used, domestically and internationally, to root certain values and perspectives in the minds of people. All wars today are fought in the media field and in the battle field. It goes without saying that combating hate speech and war propaganda in media and education long before they create the legitimisation of war-fighting is of paramount importance.

The media-politico-military complex is a reality. War reporting is a favourite subject. What cannot be pictorialised will not make it to the television screen.

Of paramount importance here is to promote a two-pronged shift, namely a) from war reporting of symptoms of underlying conflicts to conflict journalism and b) from negative news to positive news. Conflict journalism would seek to describe and explain the root causes of wars and other emergencies, i.e. the less visible, story-oriented and individualised aspects. They would be research-based rather than drama-oriented, speak to the intellect and emotions, not mainly the latter. It would take its audiences out of what Robert Jay Lifton many years ago coined "psychic numbing." Psychic numbing is likely to increase with the steady erosion of the distinction between fiction/ virtual reality and "real" reality and of the distinction between human suffering and entertainment. In addition, if repeatedly exposed to images of war and its instruments,

methods and consequences<sup>22</sup>, it is no wonder if the average citizen (the carrier or civil society) experiences a deep feeling of powerlessness.

Positive news is self-explanatory. Think for a moment if civil society everywhere was given opportunities to see not how wars are started and fought, but also how they end; not only how maldevelopment leads to emergencies, but also how successful development leads to human need satisfaction and happiness, how people learn to live peacefully together after wars and not only how they learn to hate, or how UN peacekeeping can be successful and not only a "failure".

Pluralism in the media world is an essential part of democracy and the promotion of a peace culture. New technologies such as Internet and e-mail hold the potential for a revolution in communication and the formation of world images. It holds the potential for world understanding, but also for ever more manipulation.

But technology in and of itself does not create a peace culture. Innovation will still reside in the ways people-media people, in particular-think. One of the most amazing facts of recent years is that the same news, telegrams, pictures and reports about the same events seem to surface in hundreds of newspapers, satellite channels and radio news every day. There is a few "top stories" every day disseminated by Reuters in particular; within hours an established perspective and "truth" emerge for each and the worldwide duplication and repetition is mind-boggling.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Violence is a common theme in news, (drama) documentaries, entertainment and sports and it is seldom problematised. After hours of exposure every day for years, children, youth and, of course, adults are likely to perceive it as "natural" or "unavoidable." How non-violent social change succeeds, how millions of citizens in NGOs, in UN operations, in neighbourhood communities work for peace every day almost never qualify as a topics in world media.

One classical response is that the media just cover reality, but this is simply not true; reality is also non-violent and there are "good" news.

Another response is that the media give people what they believe people want to hear and see and that they have to sell the product in the marketplace. But only a condescending attitude to fellow human beings can explain the assumption that people want predominantly to see violence and do not care about the broader, complex aspects of reality.

The world reaction to the recent tragic death of Diana Spencer and that of Mother Theresa clearly proved that citizens worldwide also want something else: stories about doing good, personal commitment for humanity, for change in rigid structures, for non-violence, campaigns against landmines, somebody good to identify with who helps the damned of the earth.

No present government leader, with the possible exception of Nelson Mandela who belongs to their category, would speak to citizens across culture like they have. This is a sign of the strength of civil society, that it does have unconstituted power. It has already changed what no one dared hope could be changed such as the British monarchy. (But contrary to expectations, not the anti-personnel mine policies of the United States).

<sup>23</sup> It is true that alternative perspectives and stories can be found in many countries. But finding them inside the ever larger media explosion requires so much time and effort that the average citizen is likely to give up.

The report/analysis that does not fit the established truth risks being considered irrelevant or unprofessional. Thus, while there is ever more pluralistic inputs into ever more different media with different constituencies, the output is not necessarily less uniform than, say, 20 years ago. Civil society would be greatly enhanced if something like a "UN World" channel, modelled upon high-quality media work such as "BBC World" were to be established. Ideally it would mean worldwide satellite programs on global issues treated in a truly global perspective and produced by multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-professional teams - in contrast to present national media which cover only domestic and foreign-policy/inter-national news with no overarching perspective or little coverage beyond national interests and sentiments.

For the flourishing of civil society, independent, broad and pluralistic media (in a broad sense) are absolutely essential. If over decades they move from reporting and conveying reality to increasingly constructing it to fit constituted and/or state interests, it spells the end of genuine civil society. That's why we have dealt with media at some length here.

With a creative mind there are no limits to what civil society can do in and of itself to mitigate conflicts, prevent violence and promote a modern peace culture. Here follow some suggestions:

- *Being attentive to conflict "signals"* and contribute as facilitators of meetings with adversaries.
- *Civil courage and dissidentship* - for instance dissenting with nationalism, racism and exploitative extraction, manufacturing, consumption and waste disposal techniques.
- *Nonviolent actions* - refuse conscription, hiding, escape, breaking laws, sit downs, marches, letters, strikes and symbolic actions. Gene Sharp provides some 180 techniques which, if practised by many, could contribute to strengthening the moral fibre and cohesion of civilians. The events in late 1996 and early 1997 in Belgrade is an example, but the only one from that region, unfortunately.
- *Withdrawing support* and resources from and boycotting those who threaten to create the emergency - whether one's own government, single politicians or international actors.
- *Alerting, informing and appealing to international bodies.*
- *Building ties and coalitions with sympathetic governments and NGOs abroad, NGO embassies and diplomatic action.*

- Building *alternative or parallel institutions* such as peace service instead of military service, people's/NGO universities<sup>24</sup> and NGO media.
- *Parallel, alternative negotiations and peace plans* emphasising civil society and the needs of the citizenry. Several were produced by intellectuals, e.g. aiming to establish a protectorate for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-1992. Governments didn't listen.

How would these principles and policies translate into the international arena? Here follow some suggestions:

- NGOs/CSOs can contribute to friendly foreign, security and defence policies and help diffuse enemy images by building twin- or sister-cities, visit conflict areas, show sympathy and tell what they have experienced when they come home; that is, broaden images of other actors and conflicting parties. Also, international monitoring, protection and support for "dissidents" and other civil society initiatives; foreign adoption of local CSOs-giving local peace workers in a broad sense a presence abroad-so that nobody will dare touch them.
- Conflict consortiums of organisations and individuals in conflict analysis, area studies, humanitarian agencies and former military and former government diplomats could be formed in every country or region with competent groups on stand-by, ready to do early analyses and warning and assess humanitarian needs should a crisis aggravate into an emergency - with close contacts to international rapid response teams linked to the UN, OSCE, UNHCR etc.<sup>25</sup>
- Functional coordination between government and citizens diplomacy, between UN peacekeeping and people's peacekeeping.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Such universities exist, for instance the International University for Peoples' Initiative for Peace, IUPIP, established by the local government and a Catholic foundation in Rovereto in the Trento province (the autonomy of which is an example of succesful conflict-resolution) of northern Italy.

<sup>25</sup> See Morten Kjaerum & Jan Oberg, *The Conflict Consortium. On Conflict Management and Humanitarian Organizations*, TFF 1997.

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. Tatsuro Kunugi, Elise Boulding and Jan Oberg, *UN Peacekeeping and Peoples' Peacebuilding. Patterns of Partnership*, TFF 1996 as one example of a concrete proposal.



- Systematic exchange of staff between governments and civil society organisations; liaison offices/committees for coordination and implementation could be attached to Ministries of Foreign Affairs.<sup>27</sup>
- Regional reconciliation institutes doing research, consultancy and training with NGOs and/or government officials in conflict areas, both in the preventive and the post-war peacebuilding mode.
- International NGOs/CSOs can, when trained, serve as impartial, fair, disinterested, competent, legitimate "citizens' diplomats" and "conflict doctors." Usually, they can get into a conflict area much earlier than government diplomats. Former humanitarian, organisational staff or development workers may have detailed knowledge about a region and their experiences could be utilised in a systematic fashion.
- Early warning, early listening and early action-something that NGOs can perhaps do better than governments which are hampered with having an embassy in the capital to which they may be confined.
- Dispatch of UN Volunteers, other experienced "White Helmets", "Peace Brigades," retired diplomats and military staff. If many more such groups were dispatched early - doing social work, moral support, accompaniment, interpositioning, living with the locals etc. serving as a protective shield with them - much suffering could be avoided.<sup>28</sup>

### *Civil society's role in emergencies*

Everything mentioned above must, of course, be intensified when a crisis starts tilting towards manifest violence or other emergency. Here the unconstituted leaders-teachers, doctors, clergy

- can play an important role by advocating and maintaining human relations as normally as possible in defiance of those who promote violent conflict. Refusing also to listen to hate propaganda has a socially important function.

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<sup>27</sup> A proposal in that direction has recently been made in a report by ambassador Lars Johnsson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm modelled upon a background paper from the TFF, Preventing Violent Conflict. A Study.

<sup>28</sup> See the seminal study by Thomas Weber, *Gandhi's Peace Army. The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping*, Syracuse University Press, 1996.

If peace education and peace service in a broad sense has been practised for some time, community building, citizens peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding becomes possible. In almost all conflict areas there are "peace pockets," areas where citizens live peacefully together and keep themselves out of violence-prone activities to make life impossible for warlords and profiteers. Tuzla and Srbac are examples from Bosnia, much of Western Slavonia as a United Nations Protected Area, UNPA, up to 1995 when the Croatian Army rolled over it and humiliated the UN and the international community.

Experimental Peacebuilding Zones (EPZ) based on negotiated agreement and international protection is another method to conceive of strengthening the forces that want to preserve (regenerate) civil society and civilised interaction. The TFF produced such a plan for Western Slavonia.<sup>29</sup> Its main purpose is to provide a time and a space for local parties, Croats and Serbs, to first build trust and then find a settlement to their differences together. Jumping directly, in a year or so, from war to conflict-resolution is impossible, as is already evidenced by the Dayton Agreement.

The EPZ contained a professional Negotiating Facility as well as thirty projects in the fields of reconstruction, security and dignity, repatriation and confidence-building. It departed from the human and social needs in that particular region, advocated empowerment of the locals and emphasised such measures as demilitarisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of DPs, joint police training, ethnically integrating projects, your-to-youth-programs, village-visitation, training in conflict-resolution and reconciliation, joint multi-ethnic workshops for professionals, community leader seminars, a Peace Park, democratisation of media and, successively, participatory governance in the region.

These activities can all be done before an emergency, but also during it and afterwards. The essential preconditions are: a) that the international community acknowledges that peace must be built also from the ground up, and b) that financial, human and organisational resources are made available. None of these conditions were fulfilled in the case of the West Slavonian peace pocket.

Joint institution-building or -maintenance across fault-lines is central. Thus in ethnically polarising situations individuals in the police, media, factories, agriculture and infrastructure

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<sup>29</sup> An Experimental Peacebuilding Zone in Western Slavonia. Peace from the Ground Up, TFF, 1995.



should do their utmost (and be helped) to recognise and demonstrate that they have common interests such as e.g. upholding a professional ethics, their employment, and their friendships.<sup>30</sup>

### *Civil society in post-emergency development*

All measures above must intensified and diversified once the war stops. Not only international organisations should undertake Lessons learned studies; certainly, also academics and other NGOs should undertake do so-to learn to avoid repetition.

To build a genuine peace, peace plans must be accepted by civil society, through referendum or otherwise, exercised through democratic participation. Peace, as little as development, can "trickle down" or be enforced.

Most post-war societies are treated as helpless, inferior and therefore clientilised by leading international organisations and powers. The choice of post-war development strategy is therefore a new challenge. In other words, where does aid programs interface with help to self-help and autonomous development, permitting the reconstruction of a minimally other-reliant and proud civil society?

Clientilisation goes hand in hand with the imposition and enforcing of "our" model, from the outside. Today it seems to be taken for granted that this is how it has to be.

Thus, without discussions, war-torn countries or new states/units born through war shall emulate existing states and have a flag, national anthem, strong military defence, market economy and privatisation, multi-party system, hard borders and they shall become and remain clients of the IMF, World Bank, NATO, EU, OSCE etc.

The question is not even raised whether they should be encouraged to consider alternatives such as defensive defence, soft borders, sustainable development based upon an alternative, perhaps culturally adapted, economics.

Naturally the post-war reconstruction effort will differ according to choice of long-range future. However, all policies must cover reconstruction or, rather, new development of

- 1) human beings, souls and bodies
- 2) social structure

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<sup>30</sup> As long as musicians played songs loved by all Yugoslavs, as long as Croatian music were performed in Belgrade and vice-versa, there was hope.

- 3) culture
- 4) environment
- 5) a peace culture.

A word of caution may be in place. Reconstruction is mostly conceived of as (re)building houses, bridges, schools, telephone lines and infrastructure, and naturally must be done, too. But one thing is to build houses of bricks, it is quite another to create homes - a sense of being rooted, of giving the children a new chance in a trustful community, feeling safe and feeling that life is once again active, purposeful and meaningful.

International intergovernmental organisations can be helpful in building homes, but none of them are geared to help creating homes. The "human dimensions" that, popularly speaking, cannot be bought for money or flown in by managing enterprises or government bureaucracies is repeatedly ending up at the bottom end of the international agenda.

These human dimensions can be cared for in a variety of ways. Space does not permit a detailed treatment of them all, but some can be mentioned to give a sense of direction:

- The noble art of saying "I am sorry" - repentance, forgiveness, respect, healing, a collective acting out of the sorrow and trauma and simultaneously moving towards a vision of peaceful existence, either together or as good neighbours; to "target" children and youth is of particular importance for long term violence prevention.
- Memorials for all victims on all sides (as in Okinawa), books, religious places, theatre performances - but also future workshops. The latter is important since crisis in general and warfare in particular lead people to see fewer and fewer options. Freeing the mind and seeing that there is a choice for the future is an essential element in healing and in democratisation.
- Truth commissions and reconciliation commissions. Selective war crimes tribunals will invariably be politicised. A permanent international criminal court, based on equality before the norms and conventions of international law, is hardly in the offing. Both will anyhow serve justice more than reconciliation in the affected society. So, until international law is truly globalised, it is relevant to look into the possibilities of various

commission-type of arrangements that may, in the best of cases, lay grievances and hate to rest.

Which actors and interests should be taken into account when setting up judicial and other post-war reconstructive, mitigating measures? It would seem that the following categories are central: a) those who suffered (victims and their closest relations); b) those who committed the crimes (the individual perpetrator), c) those who planned and /or ordered the crimes (e.g. the masterminding leading politicians, officials, officers), d) those who provided the tools such as the arms and the ammunition against the law (the 'merchants of death'), and, finally, e) the interest in overall reconciliation and peace process for all society.

The perpetrator has needs too and should be treated according to norms of a lawful state. In the case of former Yugoslavia, many of the crimes seem to have been committed by young, underprivileged men with little education who were influenced by propaganda, saw no career or job opportunities, were offered a couple of hundred Deutsch Marks per month and hoped to become famous by going to the killing fields.

Individuals are responsible for what they do, but it speaks against a humanity to indict and punish only those and not the people in power who laid the plans and organised the execution of those plans.

If governments choose only criminal courts, civil society can choose truth and reconciliation committees.

- Therapy as empowerment of survivors; reinstating self control; rejection of relations of dominance and submission; spiritual regeneration; mourning and remembrance; develop a broad attachment to others, etc
- Reconstruction of a narrative of history and the trauma and integration into memory. This can probably be done most effectively through theatre, drama, poetry, books - preferably as common projects between formerly conflicting parties.

In summary, if strategies and programs could be designed to creatively meet the human and social needs in the troubled regions, civil society would almost automatically be strengthened. It would be a partnership between internationals and locals aiming at regenerating the self-reliance capacity on the way to normalisation.

It must be remembered that civilians who have gone through wars and other catastrophes know deep down, better than anyone, how important it is to prevent violence from happening again. In that and other respects they are more resourceful and more intensely motivated than many richer nations on earth. Any foreign assistance must take care of and build upon the amazing human resources found anywhere - if we look for them - that defines civil society.

### **The political economy of conflict**

#### *Capitalism - triumphant but unsustainable*

Ours is an age in which civil society is squeezed. The re-structuring of the global capitalist system necessitates increased political and economic exploitation of the resources of civil society, of other people, culture and of Nature. Market functions, Adam Smith's invisible hand, triumphantly proliferate to countries and cultures horizontally and penetrate vertically into social, moral and individual lives.

With the demise of the East-West Cold War dynamics, other Cold Wars - closer to citizens - manifest themselves.

This very end of the 20th century is designated "post-Cold War" signifying that the global "we" does know any more precise description of it. It would seem realistic to expect more complex and speedy replay of diversified conflict-formations with people against people, states against citizens, culture against culture and humankind against Nature.

The globalisation process is predominantly economic and technological, toward one world-encompassing capitalist market, although with (culturally imprinted) variations in operation modes. No similar process is visible in the domains of politics, culture, religion or morals.

Three profound studies from 1997 document and analyse these extremely complex forces and structures and their implications for future conflicts and, thus, potential humanitarian emergencies by William Greider, Hans-Peter Martin, Harald Schumann and Michel Chossudovsky.

We choose here to concentrate on the main points of Greider's analysis:<sup>31</sup> The mobility and speed of capital movements increasingly make governments and labour losers. Capital can deal with numerous labour markets at once and pick its combination, while labour is largely fixed in one place. National governments and welfare states where they existed become losers too because they have ceded the control over commerce and finance, indeed the distribution of goods between the classes, to corporations.

Capital has wings and no ideology challenges it, not socialism, not social democracy, not the Greens; only the inner and outer limits of the global system itself. World economic and financial standardisation increases, we are indeed becoming One, whereas politically the world is fragmenting.

The 'winged', triumphant One World capitalism causes upheaval - conflicts, we would say - which revolve around the base of capitalism: the problem of supply and how to dispose of it. Capitalism's great virtue, Greider says, is its ability to yield more from less. The new machines, in particular the IT revolution, introduce dramatic opportunities both to reduce costs and to increase output - more for less - but on an exponential scale. Supply surpluses will constantly accumulate somewhere in the marketplace, i.e. goods that cannot find buyers, plants that cannot operate at full capacity.

One World capitalism does not move in the direction of the economist's golden mean; it learns to operate profitably while employing a smaller portion of the productive capacity, less labour, less capital and less resources. Says Greider, "a lean flexible enterprise arranges its elements to sustain profits while operating far below its real potential - even when a third or more of its productive base is idle. To achieve this, firms must become truly global...flexible hydras with feet planted in many different markets, making so-called world products that are adaptable across different cultures."

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<sup>31</sup> William Greider's *One World, Ready or Not. The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (Simon & Schuster, New York 1997), Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann in *The Global Trap. Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy* (Zed Books, London 1997), and Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalisation of Poverty. Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms* (Zed Books, London 1997). I make no claim to do justice to the richness of even Greider's analysis. I am well aware that, although different, they can be seen as belonging to basically the same "school" in the field and that there are other schools. I choose to highlight them here because: a) this school is grossly underrepresented in the public and academic debate about world affairs and the root causes of conflicts, b) they are well researched and c) they ask critical questions about issues most take for granted.

The economic transformations have engendered a profound identity crisis everywhere. National identity is subverted by the borderless marketplace. Greider asks: if politicians pretend they are still in charge and governments are reduced to bidding for the favours of multinational corporations, what basis will citizens have for determining their own destinies?

"The gravest danger I perceive at this moment of history is the understandable inclination of people and societies to turn back from the larger questions about the future and, instead, replay the terrible conflicts of the twentieth century. The outlines of that possibility are already visible in many societies, where middle-class security disintegrates and the lumpen ranks of alienated citizens are swelling - peasants in Asian slums, young European or Americans without work or future prospects.

Assuming that the global economic system is not redirected toward a more moderate course, these weary political and class conflicts are sure to ripen, leading toward the same stalemate between markets and society in which fascism arose and flourished nearly a hundred years ago."

Greider argues that free-running capitalism has mounted a pincer movement against the modern welfare state, aiming to disable it. One flank is accumulating indebtedness of the wealthiest, the other is capital exit. In short, government and civil society are under attack. The ethos of solidarity, justice and equality is substituted by the argument that the welfare state itself is harmful to people and has caused citizens to feel deprived of their privileges. Indeed, it is the cause of the global economic crisis. The welfare state was also a social bribery preventing the working classes from turning Red. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of socialism as a challenger, that need is now gone.

In the wake of this global transformation, Greider ponders, what will prevent people from turning to nationalism, racism, fascism and - sooner or later - violence?

If this applies to the wealthiest nations, the social consequences for the already poor-those marginalised or still outside the One World capitalist system-are devastating. While in earlier phases of capitalist expansion, individual economic units and social segments could be dispersed or within each society, contemporary capitalism is capable of discarding entire governments, small and medium-sized countries and even regions.

Greider alerts us to the limitations by stating that "the economic luxury hidden in the capitalist process is space-capitalism's ability to move on and re-create itself, abandoning the old



for the new, creating and destroying production, while trailing a broad flume of ruined natural assets in its wake. Because globalisation has narrowed distances, the luxury has diminished visibly. It is now possible for people to glimpse what was always true: the wasteful nature of their own prosperity."

In other words, capitalism is approaching its inner and outer limits. The question is not when exactly they will be reached, but how to prevent that event from causing global political, ecological, cultural and social catastrophe.

In the mainstream discourse - in academia, politics and media - nationalism, ethnicity, age-old hatred, lack of modernity/democracy/civilisation, borders problems, authoritarian leaders, poverty, hunger, or 'failed' states are said to cause the conflicts, wars and humanitarian emergencies of our time.

The superb, but somewhat varying analyses by Greider, Martin & Schumann and Chossudovsky remind us that, in spite of its huge and many-faceted dimensions, the conflict potential of global capitalism is by and large ignored when we discuss the world's ongoing humanitarian emergencies and conflicts as "political" or "ethnic" or religious and that such explanations may be little but convenient euphemisms shielding us from a more problematic truth.

Would it be psychologically surprising if intellectuals, decision-makers and citizens alike hesitate to recognise at a deeper level that this one system of which we are all part is a fundamental cause of destruction and, if continuously uncontrolled, of potential self-destruction? <sup>32</sup> Greider's analysis is useful here precisely because he does not aim at barren "anti-capitalist" or Marxist analysis and neither does he preach a return to Socialism or any new Messianic ism.<sup>33</sup> Are there ways out? There are many including sustainable development, a radical transformation of industrial civilisation itself and of the science of economics, Greider believes. Yet another is what he terms the social imperative - "to think anew rather than retreat inward. Like it or not, this will require people to reimagine themselves as social beings on a larger stage, not helpless cogs

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<sup>32</sup> Such insight would push the question of moral responsibility to extremes: "I/we" may, indirectly, be co-responsible for "their" suffering and for humanitarian emergencies in the various trouble spots throughout the world, including wars like those in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and Rwanda. But then again there is the - dangerous but understandable - fall-back position underlying so much discussion: the economic system is fundamentally good but it needs calibration and expansion to benefit everyone.

<sup>33</sup> Some might see that as a weakness, but the present author does not.

in an awesome market system...an invitation to social invention and human advancement-but only when people learn how to think expansively again about their own ideals."

He urges us to see the conflicts and the social dilemmas as well as the hidden assumptions by which we comfort ourselves while approaching the abyss. He urges us to think and act anew, in the belief that every moment of human history is also an invitation to social innovation.

What Greider essentially aims at is exactly this: empowerment of civil society, from the local to the global level, to mitigate the effects on human beings of globalised capitalism's anarchic, violent nature.

### *The case of Yugoslavia*

The breakdown of former Yugoslavia has been explained in dozens of books the last five years with reference to ethnic war, aggression, traumas, nationalism, the dissolution of Communist ideology and the Soviet Union, the impossibility of non-alignment when the blocs disappeared, by expansionist national myths (Greater Serbia) etc. In short, black and white images, reduction to two parties-one good and one bad-in conflict and a need for "third" parties to intervene to judge and set things right.

My first observation is that there may well be an element of truth in each but that they are surface appearances or instrumental features of the war through which deeper lying, essentially political-economic root causes of the conflict were played out.

My second, perhaps provocative, argument is that the international so-called community<sup>34</sup> is fundamentally incapable of perceiving and diagnosing conflicts as conflicts but see events such as Croatia, Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia etc in the perspective of foreign policy, security, alliance-building, world order, national interests, or in the light of the division of labour among international organisations.

To my knowledge, only three independent scholars have placed the political economy of former Yugoslavia at the centre of their analyses, namely Susan Woodward,<sup>35</sup> Michael Barratt

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<sup>34</sup> It is doubtful that the many countries that intervened in different capacities in the Balkan crisis should be called a "community" given their very different interests and activities that often clashed with each other.

<sup>35</sup> Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, The Brookings Institution, Washington 1995



Brown,<sup>36</sup> both having a life-long and intimate personal experience with the country, and Michel Chossudovsky.<sup>37</sup>

During TFF's conflict-mitigation work in all parts of ex-Yugoslavia since 1991, we have been driven to search for deeper answers to the question<sup>38</sup>: but what propelled these people to go for nationalism, hate, ethnic cleansing, killing and dreams about Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia etc? What kinds of needs were unsatisfied, what kinds of experiences and fears could make neighbours kill each other?

What were the root causes of the conflict that, because it was ignored and mismanaged internally and externally, sparked off the war? How could people be made to destroy this country, which they also loved for many and good reasons?

Woodward summarises what I believe is an essential argument:

"The real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order. This process occurred over a prolonged period. The conflict is not a result of historical animosities and it is not a return to the precommunist past; it is the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. A critical element of this failure was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis. More than a decade of austerity and declining living standards corroded the social fabric and the rights and securities that individuals and families had come to rely on...By the 1960s that viability had also come to depend on access to foreign credits and capital markets on the basis of Yugoslavia's strategic position in the Balkans and its independent foreign policy...

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<sup>36</sup> Michael Barrett Brown, *The Yugoslav Tragedy. Lessons for Socialists*, Spokesman, Nottingham 1996

<sup>37</sup> Michel Chossudovsky, *Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonising Bosnia*, conference paper, March 1997 and in his book, *The Globalisation of Poverty*, Zed Press, London 1997.

<sup>38</sup> My own experience with Yugoslavia dates back to 1974 when, as a student and later as lecturer, I attended the first of many courses at the Inter-University Centre, IUC, in Dubrovnik and got to know intellectuals, fine human beings, from all parts of Yugoslavia. It is my impression after some 1500 interviews there during 25 missions since 1991 that most causal analysis has been superficial, academic journalism, many made on comfortable distance or on the basis of a one or a few visits to Sarajevo, Zagreb or Ljubljana and that the majority of such analyses have been highly self-serving for the West, the so-called international "community", which from the beginning misunderstood the complexities and denied any co-responsibility for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This again has permitted, among intellectuals too, a surprisingly uncritical attitude to the ways so-called peace has been enforced in this region-again with the exception of the mentioned three authors who, like myself, have fewer illusions.

The West's euphoria over the collapse of communist states and its insistence on market reform, privatisation, and slashed budgets as conditions for economic aid and trade paid little regard to the alternative hypothesis-that the crisis of these countries grew from governments that were too weak... Economic reforms such as those demanded of Yugoslavia by foreign creditors and Western governments ask for political suicide: they require governments to reduce their own powers...Without a stable civil and legal order, the social conditions that are created can be explosive..." (op.cit. p. 15-17).

Yugoslavia had experienced a GNP growth rate of 8-10 per cent per year before the crisis unfolded. It had opened its economy to the West from the mid-1960s. As recession set in in the West, remittances from workers abroad-which had financed half of the Yugoslav trade deficit since the early 1960s-fell to 25% of the deficit. After 1982 all economic indicators were negative. Official unemployment was at 14 per cent by 1984 (full employment in Slovenia, 50 per cent in Kosovo, 23 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in large parts of Serbia). Inflation passed 50% that year, too. By the end of 1984 the average income was approximately 70 percent of the official minimum for a family of four, and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line increased from 17 to 25 percent.

One must remember that this happened in a country that was already displaying features of 'rich world-versus-poor world' inside itself. The average living standards in Slovenia and Croatia were 7-8 times higher than in the South of the country, disparities increasing over time. In addition, each republic-except Slovenia-displayed increasing income differentials over time. Among the important sectors of Yugoslavia's industrial base were textile, electronics, ship-building, electrical appliances, household goods, and armament. Due to the 'global sourcing' strategy of Western multinationals, East-Asian low-wage countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand increasingly took over this production which aggravated Yugoslavia's crisis.

Michael Barratt Brown points to the fact that debt payments began to absorb 30% of all foreign earnings and inflation reached 200 percent in 1985-88 and 1300 percent in 1989. The dinar was valueless. Yugoslavia ceased to be a single market; each republic tried to work its way out, the Northern ones through deeper economic ties with other European countries. It is worth noticing that the IMF demanded already in 1986 that the voting procedures of the National Bank

be changed from consensus to majority. Anyone who had understood anything of Yugoslavia's politico-constitutional character of a "balances-of-balances" in almost all respects would have understood that conditions/ conditionality of this sort would become nails in the Yugoslav coffin. When Ante Markovic took over as prime minister and miraculously managed to bring down the inflation, the Soviet Union had collapsed and his overtures to the US fell on deaf ears because, with the collapse, the US no longer saw a need to grant Yugoslavia any special politico-economic attention.

Michel Chossudovsky, in the mentioned paper, notes that already in 1984 a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133) under the Reagan administration entitled "United States Policy towards Yugoslavia" conformed to NSDD 54 on Eastern Europe the objectives of which were "expanded efforts to promote a 'quiet revolution' to overthrow Communist governments and parties..." and integrate these economies into the orbit of the world market.

Economic "therapy" was, thus, applied from the end of the 1980s. State revenues which should have gone as transfer payment to the republics and autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Voivodina) were instead funnelled towards servicing Belgrade's debts with the Paris and London clubs. This crippled the economy further and fuelled the process of secessionism, nationalism and national mistrust. He points out that the "bankruptcy program," as he calls it, of 1989-90 led to the lay off of more than 600,000 workers, and 500,000 industrial workers were not paid from early 1990.

Part of the IMF and World Bank program was also the deregulation of trade from January 1990, flooding the market with foreign goods and further destabilising the domestic sectors. In summary, this long-time internal economic crisis unfolding over two decades was dynamically intertwined with the external world, its economy, institutions and policies. It paved the way for, caused, aggravated or reinforced - the verb here is delicate - the concomitantly unfolding social, psychological, constitutional, political conflicts that shrewd local power politicians on all sides could translate for their own benefits into a mass mobilisation based on nationalism, ethnically-constructed enemy images, hate speech and propaganda. It is this much more complex dynamics which, in the objectively complex, specific Yugoslavian reality, ended logically and predictably in the wars and social violence we have so painfully witnessed.

Thus, the conflict(s) is not the same as the war. The war is the result of a complex set of deeper problems either not attended to or attended to in counterproductive ways by international actors.

The Yugoslavian theatre of violence consisted of a series of wars by political, military and economic elites against that yet non-realised civil society<sup>39</sup> which they knew would be a necessary element in any full transition from authoritarianism to genuine democracy. These elites also knew that a full realisation of civil society's potentials spelled the end of the authoritarian power structures they commanded, for which reason they shared an interest in derailing such a development.

Unless the international community recognises the root causes of conflict, it is bound to repeat its structure-, history- and psychology-blind programs and wreck havoc through the dynamic interplay between these programs, on the one hand, and the local/ regional realities on the other.

This is not to say that crises such as Yugoslavia's "was all the fault of capitalism" or "a political conspiracy by the international community." There is no way to perceive the Yugoslavs themselves, in particular their leaders, as innocent or helpless victims only of international development and motives.<sup>40</sup> But neither is it intellectually or morally possible to cast them as dark and primitive and the international community and its "conflict-managers" as driven by solely noble motives and love of peace.

#### *The Dayton Accords ignore civil society*

The international community's imprudent, conflict-blind economic and world order policies in the 1970s and 1980 served as one root cause of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Paradoxically you may say, there are signs that they are now being repeated in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton accords.

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<sup>39</sup> Or not yet fully realised civil society, one should say. Old Yugoslavia certainly had important elements of civil society as defined here. That was one of the reasons why it was different from other Communist states, if at all it can be categorized as such.

<sup>40</sup> We emphasise the external, structural economic roots, along with other roots, also because they are ignored in 98 percent of the analyses and discussions and 100 percent ignored by media and by diplomats, as readers of the recent books by mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg as well as by US ambassador Warren Zimmerman will have noticed.

One is immediately struck by the facts that a) the Dayton Accords provides for an almost complete foreign administration of this otherwise sovereign state, b) its Constitution is subordinated this foreign-based approach.

Significantly, the Dayton Accords were signed by three presidents, the president of Serbia (on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the president of Croatia and the president of BiH; in short by no one who represented the citizens of that country.<sup>41</sup> The idea of a referendum about the Accords, the idea of involving the ordinary citizens who were the true victims, more than leaders, does not seem to have occurred to any of the Dayton negotiation parties or international mediators.

Further, it is a fact that c) apart from the provisions concerning elections, there is no mention of civil society and no provisions for citizens or NGOs to participate in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, in peacebuilding and future development of their country. Thus its role as a model of democracy will be extremely limited, if not counterproductive.<sup>42</sup>

The catchwords of this strategy are foreign, top-down international (and top-down from Bosnian elites to citizens), interventionism, military back-up, lack of diagnosis of the problems, and delivery of aid and goods which are deemed appropriate by existing organisations where it ought to depart from an analysis of the needs of citizens and civil society.

In short, what we increasingly witness is a process of clientilisation and emulation of Western ideals, coupled with the instalment of a socio-economic system foreign to local circumstances and therefore necessarily operated by internationals.

Among the stipulations of the Dayton Accords, also called Peace Agreement, we may notice the following which are relevant to various aspects of civil society:

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<sup>41</sup> President Alija Izetbegovic who, according to the former Constitution of BiH should have handed over to another member of the collective Presidency of BiH in late 1992, has continued as president both of the country and of the SDA party since then.

<sup>42</sup> Elections were neither free nor fair, they were fraud. It is likely that individuals who will later be called to the Hague were elected-the only exception being Serb leader Radovan Karadzic who was barred from participating in politics. If and when that happens they will be protected, one may assume, by parliamentary immunity. Also, the municipal elections could spark off violence for the following reason. With refugees outside BiH participating, there will be municipalities in RS with Muslim majority and vice versa. The elected persons are not likely to live "on the other side" or participate in the assemblies - as is not the case with the 16 Muslims in the RS parliament, neither will they have been elected by citizens who live there. In such a situation the de facto control of municipalities will boil down to: who controls the police and other law and order bodies? The Bosniac government trying to establish Bosniac control in RS and vice versa can do nothing but lead to trouble.

- The High Representative - Mr. Carl Bildt as the first, then Carlos Westendorp - is appointed in consistency with UN Security Council Resolutions to coordinate, monitor, negotiate and facilitate the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The High Rep has no authority over the IFOR/SFOR and shall not interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command (Annex 10, Article II.9) but the High Rep is the final authority in theatre regarding the implementation of civilian aspects of the agreement (Annex 10, Article V), i.e. his interpretation overrules that of the local Bosnian parties.
- Economic growth and a market economy is written into the Constitution; thus, the preamble states "desiring to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy..." (Annex 4, Preamble).
- The international military force (first IFOR, presently SFOR) is established by NATO and will "operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command" (Annex 1-A, 1(b)), i.e. not in a manner that can be influenced, let alone decided or controlled, by the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina and neither, in any way, by civil society.
- The ethnic composition of the House of Peoples is also stipulated in the Constitution, thus "The House of Peoples shall comprise 15 delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs) (Annex 4, Article IV.1). The underlying assumption seems to be that ethnic identity is basic and that anyone not considering him- or herself as pure Croat, Serb or Bosniac-originally not a negligible proportion of BiH's citizens-have no influence at that level, although such citizens can presumably be elected to the other chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, the House of Representatives.  
Among those who might not be represented are Yugoslavs, Bosnians, Jews, children of mixed marriages, marriages of (former) Yugoslav nationalities with others such as people of Italian, Hungarian, Albanian etc. origin.

Furthermore, the following provisions are relevant for the reconstruction of civil society:



The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, BiH, appears only as "Annex 4" in the Dayton Accords, presumably written by non-Bosnian lawyers before and during the Dayton negotiations. The OSCE chairs the Election Commission and appoints its Bosnian members (Annex 3, Art 3.3). The Governor or the Central Bank of BiH shall be appointed by the IMF and shall not be a citizen of BiH or of any neighbouring country (Annex 4, Article VII.2). The Human Rights Chamber members shall have fourteen members eight of whom are appointed by the Council of Europe and can not be citizens of BiH (Annex 6, Article VII.2).

It is evident that "peace" is not an appropriate term for what was decided at Dayton. It is unlikely to qualify as much more than a comprehensive, extended cease fire agreement, since it does not address the causes of the conflicts and the wars. Rather, and sadly, it recreates in Bosnia-Herzegovina some of the very same root causes that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

### **In lieu of conclusion**

Under circumstances such as those of the contemporary world, terms like "failed states" convey the message that there are states which in and of themselves "fail" as if they were isolated in time and space from the rest of the world. This is misleading.

In an increasingly interdependent world with one globalising capitalist economy, conflicts abound in consequence of the enormous processes of restructuring, rationalisation and homogenisation described above. The fittest survive, others fail; but they do so also in consequence of what other states have done - or not done - to them, that is the nature of interdependence.

Thus, decision-makers shaping the international community, or the world order, ought not free themselves from a share in the responsibility for this state of affairs.

Former Yugoslavia, Somalia and others have been called "failed states." But they are our failure, too. And so is failed civil society, particularly in the centres of the world system. They will continue to fail, as long as the international community channels much more energy and creativity into fighting real and imagined wars through structural and direct violence while remaining virtually unprepared - indeed, politically incapable - to fight for peace.

An essential requirement is that we begin to see world affairs in the paradigm of conflict-mitigation and conflict-resolution based on professional treatment and not only as high

politics, high economics, geopolitics and power struggles. Conflict-resolution at its best is a positive sum-game and holds the promise to help reduce much of the unnecessary violence.

The above analysis is a plädoyer for the view that we must learn to clash as civilized creatures, not as conflict illiterates. I believe that conflict-management can and should be learnt by many more and that human emergencies and conflicts can be prevented and, when happening, handled with less violence only if we employ more professionals and fewer amateurs, however good-hearted.

If a lively debate could unfold over the nature and legitimating of violence in our countries and civilization it would mark a great step for humankind, help prevent much violence and prepare us to learn why the 20th century was the most violent of all and how the 21st must be different.

While reconstructing and energising non-violent civil society, from the smallest unit to that of global community, may seem a weak strategy toward a more humane world, it looks like it is the only one.

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